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An essay on how the post-T.R.I.P.S. regime relating to
pharmaceutical patenting in India affects issues of public access to
healthcare.

Introduction
The interface between patent law and health is particularly amplified when
one considers the specific subject focus of this essay  the aspect of the patenting
of pharmaceutical products of healthcare (drugs, medicines, and components
thereof) and the implications of such patenting on actual public access to medicines
and health. The complex subtleties involved in the issue are better appreciated if
one examines the contextual setting within which patent law and issues of health
get directly thrown into the same arena.
The existence of Indias global commitments towards intellectual property
may be significantly sourced to the contentious Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,1 [hereinafter T.R.I.P.S.] included in the
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations concluded between 125 nations
including India, in April 1994, at Marrakesh, Morocco. 2 Following the

* V Year B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) Student, National Law School of India University,
Bangalore.
1

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (W.T.O.), Annex1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENT RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, Vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 181. Due to the
successful conclusion of T.R.I.P.S. in 1994, it formed part of the legal obligations of
the newly founded successor organization of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade [hereinafter G.A.T.T.], the World Trade Organization [hereinafter W.T.O.].

2

In the interests of clarity, it remains apposite to reiterate three basic features of the
T.R.I.P.S. agreement that help contextually locate its position in the hazy domain of
international agreements and law: First, that along with approximately 25 other
legal texts, the T.R.I.P.S. Agreement forms an integral part of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization and therefore remains subject to the
W.T.O. dispute settlement system; secondly, the T.R.I.P.S. Agreement covers all the
main areas of intellectual property of which patents form a part and; thirdly, the
T.R.I.P.S. Agreement lays down the minimum standards of protection for each area
of intellectual property and provides for the remedies and procedures that can be
availed of for rights holders to avail of their rights effectively. See in this regard,
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promulgation of The Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 2004 [hereinafter Patents
Ordinance, 2004],3 on December 26, 2004, India has concluded the process of
meeting its obligations under T.R.I.P.S. by the stipulated deadline of January 1,
2005,4 with fresh attention turned towards the actual operation of pharmaceutical
product patents on all products with a patent issued after January 1, 1995.5 The
Explanation to the newly introduced Section 92A of the Indian Patent Act, 1970
broadly defines pharmaceutical products as any patented product, or product
manufactured through a patented process, of the pharmaceutical sector needed
to address public health problems and shall be inclusive of ingredients necessary
for their manufacture and diagnostic kits for their use.6
One positive approach towards the T.R.I.P.S. Agreement has been to
acknowledge that the Agreement can be interpreted in such a manner as to strike
a balance between the short-term interest in maximising access to patented
products and the long-term interest in promoting creativity, innovation, and in
providing incentives for research through patent protection.7 However, since it
may be fairly accurately stated that the minimum obligatory standards of
protection of intellectual property rights under T.R.I.P.S. with respect to the
patenting of medicines bear greater proximity to those existing in developed
countries like the United States of America [hereinafter U.S.] or the European
Union [hereinafter E.U.] vis-à-vis the developing world,8 the implementation of

W.T.O., Pharmaceutical patents and the T.R.I.P.S. Agreement, available at http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/T.R.I.P.S._e/healthdeclexpln_e.htm (last visited on
June 14, 2006). For a detailed interesting study of the developed-developing countries
tussle in the follow-up to the T.R.I.P.S. Agreement, see, JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS  IN THE W.T.O. AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 11  47 (2001) [hereinafter
WATAL].
3

THE PATENTS (AMENDMENT) ORDINANCE, 2004, Ord. No. 7 of 2004, available at
http://lawmin.nic.in/Patents%20Amendment%20Ordinance%202004.pdf (last
visited on June 14, 2006).

4

See Article 65 of the T.R.I.P.S. Agreement relating to transitional arrangements.

5

In this regard, Article 27 of the T.R.I.P.S. Agreement provides that subject to certain
exceptions, W.T.O. members have to provide patent protection for any invention,
whether a product (including medicines) or a process (including methods of
production of medicines). See also, Article 29 and Article 33 of the T.R.I.P.S.
Agreement, which deal with conditions on patent applications and the term of
protection respectively.

6

See, § 54 of the Patents Ordinance, 2004.

7

See, World Trade Organisation, Pharmaceutical patents and the T.R.I.P.S. Agreement,
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/T.R.I.P.S._e/
healthdeclexpln_e.htm (last visited on June 14, 2006).

8

See, WATAL, supra note 2, at 11  47.
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T.R.I.P.S. brings with it fears of higher prices for patented medicines and
consequent impediments to patented medicine access by the poor in developing
countries. 9
In response to fears that the T.R.I.P.S. agreement may make some drugs
difficult to obtain for patients in poor countries, the developing countries
succeeded in getting W.T.O. trade ministers at the Doha Ministerial Conference in
November, 2001, to adopt the landmark Declaration on the T.R.I.P.S. Agreement
and Public Health [hereinafter Doha Declaration],10 which affirmed that public
health took precedence over private patent rights, and reaffirmed the rights of
governments to use inbuilt W.T.O. public health safeguards and other available
measures to gain access to cheap medicines.11
It is the potential impact of these radical regime changes, which has led
Farias and Zacharias to point out that the Indian pharmaceutical industry is a
prime example of a growing, successful, and high-technology industry that is
being forced to re-structure and re-conceptualise its long-term strategies and
operating models in light of Indias broad-ranging policy to open its markets to

9

In this regard, Gray has reiterated the well-accepted W.H.O. approach which
emphasizes that affordable prices for rationally selected medicines constitutes a
vital determinant of the access to medicines and health in both developed and
developing countries. See, Andy Gray, Access to Medicines and Drug Regulation in
Developing Countries: a Resource Guide for DFID (D.F.I.D. Health Systems Resource
Centre, London, 2004), available at http://www.dfidhealthrc.org/shared/
publications/Issues_papers/ATM/Gray.pdf (last visited on June 14, 2006)
[hereinafter Gray]. Further, Scherer and Watal point out that since developing
countries spend a much larger percentage of their private household health
expenditures on drugs, the affordability of the patented drugs remains of vital
importance. That apart, the implications of an H.I.V./A.I.D.S. pandemic have
focused attention on issues of access and affordability of life-saving drugs. See, F.M.
Scherer and Jayashree Watal, Post-T.R.I.P.S. Options for Access to Patented Medicines
in Developing Countries (Paper No. WG4: 1, C.M.H. Working Paper Series, 2001),
available at http://www.cmhealth.org/docs/wg4_paper1.pdf (last visited on June
14, 2006) [hereinafter Scherer and Watal].

10

Declaration On The T.R.I.P.S. Agreement And Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2,
adopted on 14 November 2001, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_T.R.I.P.S.e.htm (last visited on June 14, 2006)
[hereinafter Declaration].

11

For a scathing analysis of the actual U.S. response to the mandate laid down at Doha,
see, US Bullying on Drug Patents: One Year after Doha (Oxfam International Briefing
Paper, 2002), available at www.oxfam.org/eng/pdfs/pp021112 bullying patents.pdf
(last visited on June 14, 2006) [hereinafter Oxfam].
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global trade, and consequently, to meet a spectrum of global commitments
including the adequate protection of intellectual property.12
In this context, this essay, while recognizing the existence of the problem
of public access to health and its relevance to India and the Indian pharmaceutical
industry, seeks to briefly suggest answers to two questions: first, what are the
implications of the T.R.I.P.S. regime on pharmaceutical patenting in India and on
public access to health within India and; secondly, what are the implications of
the T.R.I.P.S. regime on public access to health (including creation of new
medicines) with particular relevance to Indias role as a leading producer and
exporter of low-priced generic drugs. 13 The common focus, in answering both
these questions, will remain on ascertaining and tentatively suggesting the
optimum strategic, policy-level choices available to India, so as to meet with its
global commitments under T.R.I.P.S. while adhering to the need to enable public
access to health, as enshrined in the Doha Declaration.
It is hoped that a specific analysis and enumeration of this largely understudied though critically relevant area involving patent law and health, will help
clarify the current situation regarding pharmaceutical patenting in India, post
January 1, 2005 and the imminent potential impact on public access to health.

The Impact of T.R.I.P.S. and the Doha Declaration on Public
Access to Healthcare
The Basic Balance under T.R.I.P.S.
As stated earlier, Article 27 of the T.R.I.P.S. Agreement provides that
patents shall be available for any invention, whether a product or process, in all
fields of technology without discrimination, where those inventions meet the
standard substantive criteria for patentability  namely, novelty, inventive step
and industrial applicability. Further, under Article 33 of the T.R.I.P.S. Agreement,

12

See, Nilesh Zacharias and Sandeep Farias, Patents and the Indian Pharmaceutical
Industry, available at http://www.nishithdesai.com/Research.htm (visited on June
14, 2006) [hereinafter Zacharias and Farias].

13

As to the meaning of generics  When copies of patent drugs are made by other
manufactures, they are either sold under the name of the chemical ingredient
(making them clearly generic), or under another brand name (which means they
are still generics from the point of view of patents). See, W.T.O., T.R.I.P.S. and
Pharmaceutical Patents  Fact Sheet, 2003, available at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/T.R.I.P.S._e/factsheet_pharm00_e.htm (last visited on June 14, 2006)
[hereinafter Fact Sheet].
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such patent protection has to last for at least twenty years from the date of filing
the patent application. The basic patent right may be understood to mean that
patents provide the patent owner with the legal means to prevent others from
making, using, or selling the new invention for a limited period of time, subject to
a number of exceptions.14
Under Article 27, Governments can refuse to grant patents for three reasons
that could possibly relate to public health:


inventions whose commercial exploitation needs to be prevented to protect
human, animal or plant life or health.



diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for treating humans or
animals.



certain plant and animal inventions.

Further flexibilities are inbuilt into the T.R.I.P.S. Agreement including research exceptions and bolar provisions under Article 30, anti-competitive
practice and abuse of intellectual property rights under Article 8.2 read with
Article 40, compulsory licensing under Article 31, and parallel imports and
exhaustion of rights when read with Article 6 of the T.R.I.P.S. Agreement. 15 Such
flexibilities and their significance find further mention later in this paper.

The Role of the Doha Declaration
Since there existed a large degree of uncertainty regarding the interpretation
of these T.R.I.P.S. flexibilities, and the extent to which their use would be respected,
W.T.O. member governments stressed on the importance of implementing and
interpreting the T.R.I.P.S. Agreement in a way that supported public health by
promoting both access to existing medicines and the creation of new medicines,
as part of the main Doha Ministerial Declaration of November 14, 2001.
Consequently, the Doha Declaration on T.R.I.P.S. and Public Health responded to
the concerns raised above in a number of ways:16
First, it emphasized that the T.R.I.P.S. Agreement does not and should not
prevent W.T.O. member governments from taking measures to protect public
14

See, Fact Sheet, Id.

15

See in this regard, Scherer and Watal, supra note 9.

16

See generally, W.T.O., The Separate Doha Declaration Explained, available at http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/T.R.I.P.S._e/healthdeclexpln_e.htm (last visited on
June 14, 2006).

50

Pharmaceutical Patents and Healthcare
health, and reaffirmed the members rights to use fully the provisions of the
T.R.I.P.S. Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose.17 The substantive
import of such statements from all W.T.O. members supports the conclusion that
the Doha Declaration is conclusive of the fact that W.T.O. member states will not
try to prevent each other from using these provisions.18
Secondly, the declaration emphasizes that the T.R.I.P.S. Agreement should
be interpreted and implemented in a manner that supports W.T.O. members right
to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for
all.19 The Declaration also reiterates the importance of the objectives 20

Objectives
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion of


technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of
technology, to the mutual advantage



of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner
conducive to social and economic welfare,



and principles21 of the T.R.I.P.S. Agreement for interpreting its provisions.22

17

¶ 4 and 5, Doha Declaration, supra note 10.

18

See, Fact Sheet, supra note 13.

19

¶ 4, Doha Declaration, supra note 10.

20

Article 7 of the T.R.I.P.S. Agreement states: Objectives
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to
the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological
knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a
balance of rights and obligations.

21

Article 8 of the T.R.I.P.S. Agreement states: Principles

1. Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological
development, provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this
Agreement.
2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this
Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by
right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely
affect the international transfer of technology.
22

¶ 5 (a), Doha Declaration, supra note 10.
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Thirdly, the declaration contains a number of important clarifications
regarding the flexibilities contained in the T.R.I.P.S. Agreement, which are made
while reiterating members commitments under the T.R.I.P.S. Agreement:23
On compulsory licensing, the declaration makes it clear that each member
is free to determine the grounds upon which the licences are granted and further
that each member has the right to determine what constitutes a national
emergency or other circumstance of extreme urgency, with the reiteration that
public health crises, including H.I.V./A.I.D.S., tuberculosis, malaria and other
epidemics, can fit the bill.24
The declaration also refers to the exhaustion of intellectual property rights,
and therefore addresses the question of a members right to allow parallel imports.
The declaration makes it clear that the T.R.I.P.S. Agreements provisions on
exhaustion in effect leave each member free to establish its own regime without
challenge  subject to the general T.R.I.P.S. provisions prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of a persons nationality.25 Importantly, the declaration does not
remove the need for each country to take the necessary steps domestically to use
this flexibility where necessary if it wants to ensure that medicines are available
at affordable prices.26
Finally, on the issue of importing under compulsory license, Paragraph 6 of
the Doha Declaration assigned further work to the T.R.I.P.S. Council to sort out
how to ensure extra flexibility so that countries unable to produce
pharmaceuticals domestically, could obtain supplies of copies of patented drugs
from other countries.27 This aspect, which is often referred to as the Article 6
issue, was ultimately resolved on August 30, 2003, and has been studied in greater
detail in the next section.

Article 6 of the Doha Declaration Clarified
As mentioned earlier, as regards the issue of importing under compulsory
license, the Doha Declaration had assigned further work to the T.R.I.P.S. Council
to sort out how to ensure extra flexibility so that countries unable to produce

23

¶ 5, Doha Declaration, supra note 10. See also, Scherer and Watal, supra note 9.

24

¶ 5 (b) and 5 (c), Doha Declaration, supra note 10.

25

¶ 5 (d), Doha Declaration, supra note 10.

26

See, Fact Sheet, supra note 13.

27

¶ 6, Doha Declaration, supra note 10.
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pharmaceuticals domestically could obtain supplies of copies of patented drugs
from other countries.28 On August 30, 2003, W.T.O. member governments broke
their final deadlock over intellectual property protection and public health and
agreed on legal changes that will make it easier for poorer countries to import
cheaper generics made under compulsory licensing if they are unable to
manufacture the medicines themselves.29 Article 31(f) of the T.R.I.P.S. Agreement
provides that products made under compulsory licensing must be predominantly
for the supply of the domestic market. This applies directly to countries that can
manufacture drugs including India  since it limits the amount they can export
when the drug is made under compulsory licence, and it has an indirect impact on
countries unable to make medicines and therefore wanting to import generics
since they would find it difficult to find countries that can supply them with drugs
made under compulsory licensing. The August 30, 2003 agreement allows any
member country to export pharmaceutical products made under compulsory
licences within the terms set out in the decision, and essentially takes the form of
an interim waiver, which allows countries producing generic copies of patented
products under compulsory licences, to export the products to eligible importing
countries.30 Significantly, the decision covers patented products or products made
using patented processes in the pharmaceutical sector, including active ingredients
and diagnostic kits, and the waiver would last until the W.T.O.s intellectual
property agreement is amended.31 The stipulated conditions aim to ensure the
beneficiary countries can import the generics without undermining patent
systems, particularly in rich countries, and include measures to prevent the
medicines from being diverted to the wrong markets and also require governments
using the system to keep all other members informed, although W.T.O. approval
is not required. At the same time phrases such as reasonable measures within
their means and proportionate to their administrative capacities are included
to prevent the conditions becoming burdensome and impractical for the importing
countries. 32 Clearly, this decision carries a significant impact for Indias
pharmaceutical industry, with its well-established capabilities for producing
generic drugs.

28

Id.

29

See generally, World Trade Organisation, Decision removes final patent obstacle to
cheap drug imports, available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres03_e/
pr350_e.htm (visited on June 14, 2006).

30

Id.

31

Id.

32

See Fact Sheet, supra note 13.
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An Overview of Health and the Pharmaceutical Industry in
India
India, with a large part of its population living below the poverty line, with
high figures of out-of-pocket expenses towards health care, and with highly
unsatisfactory health indices, clearly suffers from a significant health crisis with
inadequate public access to health care as such, a situation which will undoubtedly
experience further change once the T.R.I.P.S. regime as regards pharmaceutical
patenting comes fully into effect in India.33 Further, pharmaceutical patenting in
India is of special relevance to issues of public health since Indian pharmaceutical
firms are important suppliers of low-priced active pharmaceutical ingredients
and finished products domestically and to several developing countries. Many
fear that the introduction of product patents could possibly destroy these
industries and thereby lead to increased drug prices,34 thereby exacerbating the
prevailing health crises in the areas of delivery of those drugs.

33

The National Health Policy 2002 details out the exact extent and nature of the
current public health crisis in India. See, NATIONAL HEALTH POLICY 1  5 (2002), available
at http://mohfw.nic.in (last visited on June 14, 2006). Significantly, paragraph
4.26 of this policy document reads:
4.26 IMPACT OF GLOBALISATION ON THE HEALTH SECTOR
4.26.1 The Policy takes into account the serious apprehension, expressed by several
health experts, of the possible threat to health security in the post-T.R.I.P.S. era, as
a result of a sharp increase in the prices of drugs and vaccines. To protect the citizens
of the country from such a threat, this policy envisages a national patent regime for
the future, which, while being consistent with T.R.I.P.S., avails of all opportunities
to secure for the country, under its patent laws, affordable access to the latest medical
and other therapeutic discoveries. The policy also sets out that the Government will
bring to bear its full influence in all international fora  U.N., W.H.O., W.T.O., etc.
 to secure commitments on the part of the Nations of the Globe, to lighten the
restrictive features of T.R.I.P.S. in its application to the health care sector.

34

Grace succinctly explains the line of reasoning connecting intellectual property,
pharmaceutical firms in India, and issues of public health and access to medicines
through the following words: Enhanced IP protection can close off certain revenue
options and cause a reorientation of firms strategies. This reorientation can affect
industry structure and types of competition, and this can lead to changes in prices,
quality levels and physical availability. Similarly, access to new medicines can also
be affected by enhanced IP protection, but indirectly, through IPs influence on a
firms market orientation, and thus, the incentive structure to invest in R&D. The
incentive to invest in R&D has implications for the number and type of new drugs
that are developed through this investment. See, Cheri Grace, The Effect of Changing
Intellectual Property on Pharmaceutical Industry Prospects in India and China Considerations for Access to Medicines (D.F.I.D. Health Systems Resource Centre,
London,
2004),
available
at
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/
indiachinadomproduce.pdf (last visited on June 14, 2006) [hereinafter Grace].
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Data suggests that with an overall production of approximately $7.3 billion
(comprising domestic consumption of finished products and exports), Indian
firms produce approximately 1.5% of the global pharmaceutical market of $480
billion. Importantly however, this small share in value terms belies the importance
of the Indian industry in volume terms, which has been estimated at more than
20% of global consumption.35 Having undertaken a detailed study of the Indian
pharmaceutical industry, 36 Grace concludes that the present production and
functioning and the future prospects of the Indian pharmaceutical industry are of
great significance from three perspectives: first, from the standpoint of domestic
access to medicines within India; second, from the standpoint of international
access to medicines produced wholly or in part by the Indian pharmaceutical
industry and; third, and more specifically, from the standpoint of access to
medicines within product segments that treat diseases specifically prevalent in
poor countries.37 Such a broad conclusion can be better appreciated once it is
acknowledged that a key objective of policy-makers in the developing world has
been to ensure the availability of new medical treatments, at affordable prices, to
patients in the region, and this objective is vastly aided by adoption of a processpatent regime for pharmaceuticals which allows pharmaceutical firms in
developing countries to specialize in the production of cheap, generic versions of
on-patent drugs for domestic markets, as well as for export to other countries
where similar patent regimes were in place.38 Farias and Zacharias more or less
sum up the situation by pointing out that the current industry players comprise
several privately owned Indian companies that have captured a substantial share
in the domestic pharmaceutical market owing to favourable government policies

35

Goldman Sachs, Global Healthcare: Indian Pharmaceuticals, PASSAGE
16, 2004) at 1.

36

See, Grace, supra note 34, at 13  27.

37

With specific regard to this third perspective, it is apposite to draw the distinction
between medical research and development related to global diseases such as cancer,
which have a presence in both the developed and developing world, and research
related to poor country ailments such as malaria, tuberculosis, H.I.V./A.I.D.S.,
etc. found primarily in the developing world. The point essentially is that since poor
country specific ailments such as malaria, T.B., etc, have no significant markets in
the developed world, stronger intellectual property in the developing world itself
might be the key to inducing new and better medical treatment for these ailments,
subject to the commercial viability of such research and development projects. See
generally, Rachel Glennerster and Michael Kremer, A Better Way to Spur Medical
Research and Development, 23(2) REGULATION, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/
regulation/regv23n2/kremer.pdf (visited on June 14, 2006); Veena Mishra,
T.R.I.P.S., Product Patents and Pharmaceuticals, 39(48) ECON. & POL . WKLY. 4464
(2001).

38

See, Veena Mishra, Id.
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and limited competition from overseas, among other things.39 Further, it is well
documented that copied brands of drugs, patented in foreign countries, have
typically been introduced in the Indian market soon after the introduction of
these drugs in the original market by the patent-holder, thereby implying that
pharmaceutical multinationals did not enjoy a substantial first-mover advantage
in selling a newly developed drug on the Indian market.40 This fact has significantly
contributed to the trend wherein many multinational pharmaceuticals chose not
to supply the Indian market at all because of lower likelihood of profits on account
of cheaper domestic generic alternatives.41

Pre-T.R.I.P.S. and Post-T.R.I.P.S. Law Applicable to
Pharmaceutical Patenting in India
India initially had a product patent regime for all inventions under the
Patents and Designs Act 1911, a situation that changed, in 1970, when the
government introduced the new Patents Act, 1970 [hereinafter the pre-T.R.I.P.S.
Act], which excluded pharmaceuticals and agrochemical products from eligibility
for patents.42 This exclusion was introduced to break away Indias dependence on
imports for bulk drugs and formulations and provide for development of a selfreliant indigenous pharmaceutical industry.43 An amended form of the Act is on
the statute books today, and this essay shall refer to the provisions of the Act
applicable as law since 1970, until impacted upon by India signing T.R.I.P.S. in
1994, as pre-T.R.I.P.S. law. Post 1994, the Act has been amended in 1999,44 2002,45
and 2004 (most recently through the Patents Ordinance, 2004).
Section 43 of the pre-T.R.I.P.S. Act broadly provided for the granting of
patents on satisfaction of the necessary requirements, one exception to which
was enshrined in Section 5, which unambiguously provided that with respect to
inventions claiming substances intended to be used or capable of being used as
food or as a medicine or drug, no patent would be granted to claims for the

39

See, Zacharias and Farias, supra note 12, at 1.

40

See, J.O. Lanjouw, The Introduction of Pharmaceutical Product Patents in India:
Heartless Exploitation of the Poor and Suffering?, N.B.E.R. Working Paper No. 6366,
Cambridge, 1997.

41

See, Zacharias and Farias, supra note 12, at 1.

42

§ 5, Indian Patent Act, 1970.

43

See, Zacharias and Farias, supra note 12, at 1.

44

See, The Patents (Amendment) Act, 1999 (17 of 1999).

45

See, The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002 (38 of 2002).
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substances themselves, but claims for the methods or processes of manufacture
of the same substance were nonetheless patentable. The term of such process
patents was for a period of seven years from the date of the patent or for five years
from the date of sealing of the patent, whichever period was shorter.46 In light of
Indias obligations under Article 27 of T.R.I.P.S. requiring availability of patents
on all product inventions, Section 4 of the Patents Ordinance, 2004 provides that
Section 5 of the Act is to be omitted, and consequently, the solely-process patent
regime relating to substances intended to be used or capable of being used as food
or as a medicine or drug as provided for in the exception-creating Section 5,
which dates back to 1970, has now come to a definitive end. Section 53 of the Act,
which provided specifically for the 5 or 7 year patent term for drugs or medicines,
had been amended as recently as 2002, so as to provide for a uniform term of 20
years from the date of filing of the patent application for all patents, in consonance
with Article 33 of T.R.I.P.S.
Carsten Fink has pointed out that under the pre-T.R.I.P.S. Act, there were
four provisions which substantially limited the scope of available process
protection,47 and these may be conceptualized as provisions benefiting a scenario
of greater access to medicines and drugs covered by patents: first, after three
years from the date of sealing a pharmaceutical process patent, the patent was
deemed to be endorsed with the words licences of rights,48 which implied that
under Section 88(5) of the pre-T.R.I.P.S. Act, the patent owner was obliged to
license the patented process to any interested party with a maximum possible
royalty of 4 percent of the net ex-factory sale price in bulk of the patented article
to be payable by the licensee; second, at any time after the expiration of three
years from the date of sealing of a pharmaceutical patent, the government, if
satisfied that the patented product was not available to the public at reasonable
prices or that other public interests were not satisfied, could grant a compulsory
license, the terms of which were to be set by the government, unless the patent
owner and licensee could find agreement between themselves;49 third, a patented
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§ 53(1)(a), the pre-T.R.I.P.S. Act.
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See, Carsten Fink, How Stronger Patent Protection in India might Affect the Behaviour
of
Transnational
Pharmaceutical
Industries,
available
at
http://
wbln0018.worldbank.org/research/workpapers.nsf/0/
5d9b67dfa0777405852568e80065f3c4/$FILE/wps2352.pdf (last visited on June
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§ 87, pre-T.R.I.P.S. Act.
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See, § 84 and § 85 of the pre-T.R.I.P.S. Act providing for applications for granting of
compulsory licenses and matters to be taken into account when granting compulsory
licenses respectively. Also see, § 90 of the pre-T.R.I.P.S. Act dealing with the
interpretation of the words reasonable requirements of the public in § 84.
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pharmaceutical process must be worked in India within three years from the date
of sealing the patent, and importation of a drug produced with the patented process
is not considered as working the patent,50 and; fourth, the burden of proof in case
of patent infringement rests with the patent owner.51 On such a basis, Fink concludes
that in essence, the Act gave very limited protection to research-based
pharmaceutical companies, and firms producing generic drugs only had to avoid
patented processes, so as to legitimately copy a newly developed drug.52 Further,
Section 47(4) of the pre-T.R.I.P.S. Act expressly provided that the government
may import any medicine or drug for distribution in any dispensary, hospital or
other medical institution maintained by or on behalf of the Government or those
specified in such behalf by the Government. Indias obligations under T.R.I.P.S.
introduced radical changes to the understanding of such provisions under the
Act:
Article 30 of T.R.I.P.S. provides that W.T.O. Members may provide limited
exceptions to the exclusive rights53 conferred by a patent, provided that such
exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with the normal exploitation of the patent
and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner,
provided that the legitimate interests of third parties have been taken into
consideration. Further, Article 31 lays down a list of provisions applicable in all
situations where the law of a W.T.O. Member country permits use of the subject
matter of the patent without authorization of the patent holder.54 Since Article
27.1 of T.R.I.P.S. states - patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable
without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and
whether products are imported or locally produced,  the agreement clearly
does not permit any discrimination between an imported product and a domestic
product leading to the conclusion that importation is equivalent to the working of
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See, § 83 and § 84 (1), pre-T.R.I.P.S. Act.
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See, generally Chapter XVIII, pre-T.R.I.P.S. Act.
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See, Fink, supra note 47.
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Article 28 of T.R.I.P.S. enumerates the exclusive rights conferred by product and
process patents.
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Article 31 includes, inter alia, that such authorization will be considered on its
individual merits, that such use may be permitted only if, prior to such use, that the
proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder at
reasonable commercial terms and conditions that have been unsuccessful within a
reasonable period of time, that such use shall be non-exclusive and non-assignable,
that such authorization be liable to be terminated in certain conditions, that the
right holder be paid adequate economic remuneration in each case taking into
account the economic value of the authorization, that the decision as to authorization
and as to remuneration provided be subject to judicial review, etc.
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a patent. Finally, Article 34 of T.R.I.P.S. provides that the burden of proof in cases
of process patent infringement primarily lies upon the alleged infringer, subject
to certain stipulated exceptions.
Accordingly the Patents Amendment Act, 2002, substituted Chapter XVI
of the pre-T.R.I.P.S. Act for a new Chapter XVI which, inter alia  effectively
omitted reference to the license of rights clause and its impact under Section 87
and Section 88 of the pre-T.R.I.P.S. law; considerably increased the stringency of
requirements for the issue of a compulsory license under Section 84 of the Act;
included importation with working under Section 83 and Section 84 of the Act;
has placed the burden of proof in cases of infringement primarily upon the alleged
infringer under the newly introduced Section 104A in accord with Article 34 of
T.R.I.P.S. and; left untouched the provision under Section 47(4) of the Act. Further,
through the introduction of five new clauses (clause (c) to clause (g)) under the
general principles applicable to the working of patents under Section 83 of the
Act, the importance of technology transfer, public health, and public access at
reasonable costs, has been reiterated. The Patents Ordinance, 2004, does not
change the position as regards any of these aspects. Further, in consonance with
the August 30, 2003 clarification regarding Article 6 of the Doha Declaration,
which has been discussed earlier, the Patents Ordinance, 2004 introduces Section
92A to the Act, which provides for compulsory licenses for manufacture and
export of patented pharmaceutical products to countries having insufficient or
no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector.55
On consideration of the overall current scenario in light of the provisions of
the pre-T.R.I.P.S. legislation, it is evident that on one hand, the Act has clearly
moved towards a strengthening of intellectual property protection in the
pharmaceutical sector, while on the other hand has repeatedly reiterated the
importance of public health and reasonable public access to health despite
increased patent protection. The coming days will indicate how such provisions
operate in practice, and the extent to which they are accepted by the international
community, particularly countries of the developed world.

Consequences of T.R.I.P.S.-Compliant Indian Legislation
Relating to Pharmaceuticals
The changes described above give rise to various concerns, especially in
the context of pharmaceuticals, and it is apposite to briefly address the same
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here. Broadly speaking, such concerns may be represented in the following
manner:56

(I)

Indias legislation formerly excluded patent coverage for
pharmaceutical products, and once product patents in these areas
are granted, indigenous research and development will be adversely
affected.

This argument tends to suggest that an enormous amount of money is spent
by Indian pharmaceutical companies on research and development, while the
actual figure has been estimated to be a mere 1-2% of drug sales, as compared to
figures of 15% in Europe and North America and 10% in Japan.57 Therefore, the
argument that stronger patent protection encourages research and development
and stimulates foreign direct investments into the sector, which in turn further
stimulates indigenous research and development efforts, cannot be ignored. At
one level, product patents could encourage multinational firms and larger Indian
business groups to invest more in research and development in India, and Indias
advantage of low cost scientific manpower could then easily translate into the
development of new drugs.58 Secondly, stronger patent protection would also
directly stimulate innovative indigenous pharmaceutical companies to directly
invest in research and development, and such innovation would have the potential
to take the Indian pharmaceutical forward, from just being a large industry of
copied drugs.

(II) Earlier, domestic pharmaceutical companies could develop new
processes for new drugs, which were therefore introduced in India
within three to five years following their arrival on the international
market. With the introduction of product patents, these new drugs
might not arrive in the Indian market for significantly long periods.59
In response to such an argument, it is suggested that once product patents
are introduced, the patent holders will be encouraged to market their products in
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Property Right Protection under the W.T.O., available at http://www.idfresearch.org/
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India immediately (keeping in mind the large potential that the Indian market
holds for such suppliers), without having to wait for the four to five years normally
required for the development of alternative processes. The risk, of course, remains
that certain necessary drugs will not be introduced in India on account of low
potential for economic returns.

(III) The requirements for compulsory licensing have been considerably
strengthened thereby rendering such a provision virtually useless as
regards ensuring of public access to healthcare.
While it is undeniable that it will be more difficult to resort to compulsory
licensing mechanisms, it is suggested that the language under T.R.I.P.S. and the
amended Indian legislation will allow adequate use of the same in the interests of
public health and public access to medicine.60 Specifically, the amended Indian
legislation still permits compulsory licensing, albeit under strict conditions  and
it is hoped that such compulsory licensing will ensure that emergencies are
successfully averted, while at the same time protecting the economic interests of
the patent holders.

(IV) The introduction of product patents could result in a monopoly for
multinational pharmaceutical companies, which acquires added
significance since the duration of the patent has been increased to
twenty years. Consequently, drug prices in India could go up
dramatically, and such a conclusion is inevitable when one considers
cross-country prices for the same drug across post-T.R.I.P.S. and preT.R.I.P.S. countries.
It is undeniable that as mentioned earlier, the system of process patents
encouraged a large number of manufacturers to enter the pharmaceutical industry,
and the resultant competition led to sharp drops in prices. Subsumed in these low
costs are expenses saved in not having to spend money on research and
development for a new drug, including recouping costs of failure and the saving of
costs on clinical trials.61 The transition periods allowed for under the T.R.I.P.S.
regime give India an opportunity to ensure that the groundwork required for a
complete transition to the product patent regime does take place. At the same
time, Indian pharmaceutical companies should strengthen their research and
development focus to prepare for the transition to a completely product-patent
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based regime. It is, of course, indisputable that with the introduction of product
patents, drug prices are bound to go up, but there remain several undeniable
reasons indicating that the fears of an overwhelming price rise are greatly
exaggerated, and it is to this that we turn our attention next.

Countering the Drug Price-Rise Hypothesis
Since the primary criticism against T.R.I.P.S. on the ground of access to
health pertains to the inevitable rising price of drugs following the implementation
of T.R.I.P.S., it becomes necessary to very briefly critically analyse the question
of the relationship between the implementation of T.R.I.P.S. and increased drug
prices.
First, the prediction that drug prices in India are going to rise exponentially
following the full effect of T.R.I.P.S., is largely premised on cross-country
comparisons of drug prices. In this regard however, it remains necessary to
reiterate that cross-country comparisons of the prices of any item, drugs or
otherwise, are fraught with problems. Significantly, such prices depend on several
complex factors. Absence or presence of product patents would be but one of the
factors playing in the situation, influencing price. For example, prices of drugs
are often determined primarily by what the market can bear, which would explain
why drugs are expensive in the U.S. where there exists a fairly comprehensive
medical insurance system established.62 Similarly, it is suggested that many drugs
are cheap in India largely on account of the Drug Price Control Order [hereinafter
D.P.C.O.],63 which applies independent of the larger issue of product or process
patents.64 In this regard, it should be remembered that governments have a range
of public policy measures before them outside the field of intellectual property to
address issues of access to and prices of drugs, and Article 8 of the T.R.I.P.S.
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Agreement makes it clear that W.T.O. Members may, in formulating or amending
their rules and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health
and nutrition, provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of
the Agreement.
Second, the categorization of drugs as essential or non-essential under the
DPCO assumes special significance. The rise in prices of non-essential drugs does
not serve as a cause for grave concern, and essential drugs continue to be priced
low under the D.P.C.O.65
Third, it is well documented that less than 10% of the essential drugs
worldwide are covered by patents, with the rest having all become generic drugs
implying no compulsion of granting a fresh round of patent protection to the
same. Similarly, if one scans the Indian list of essential drugs, one discovers that
less than 10% of them are covered by patents worldwide and therefore, at best,
only a few drugs would be affected by the price rise. In the short run, the prices of
most essential drugs will not be affected at all, while in the long run, as patent
protection stimulates more research and development and more competition,
the prices of all drugs should logically come down.66
Fourth, there is an impression that granting product patents necessarily
implies monopolies for long periods of twenty years. Keeping in mind regulatory
approvals, clinical trials, and the duration of time taken to bring a drug to the
market, it is rare that a drug has a monopoly for more than a short period of five
years or so.67
Fifth, it remains important to reiterate that a product patent does not
necessarily confer a monopoly on the pharmaceutical company, especially in
light of the fact that most new drugs are substitutes for existing drugs, with slightly
different therapeutic or side effects, and therefore, even if a drug is on patent,
there will generally be cheaper drugs that are off-patent and unaffected by
monopoly considerations.68
Finally, even if some drugs are on patent now, one must remember that the
exclusivity of patent protection does not extend indefinitely. For example, out of
the drugs manufactured in India today, almost all are already generic, and with
regard to the few new drugs under consideration, the patent protection will
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definitely come to an end within a fixed period.69 Clearly therefore, an exponential
price rise following the effectuation of T.R.I.P.S.-compliant provisions is not the
only possible future trajectory for India. The moot point however, is to ensure
that adequate and necessary steps be taken to ensure that such a price rise does
not occur.

Concluding Remarks
Scherer states that it is reasonably well established in economic literature
that, especially in a world of A.I.D.S. and resistant tuberculosis epidemics, lowincome nations enjoy higher economic welfare when they can free-ride on
pharmaceutical innovations made and patented in the first world than when they
must pay monopolistic prices for the newest and most effective drugs, 70 and
following a detailed economic analysis concludes that global welfare would also
benefit greater by such free-riding as opposed to uniform patenting laws.71 The
measures that developing nations like India might adopt in the new T.R.I.P.S.
environment to enhance low-cost access to the newest drugs, retaining benefits
they enjoyed pre-T.R.I.P.S. where they pursued aggressive generic substitution
policies previously, include several policy options - notably, compulsory
licensing, utilizing parallel trade, enforcing price controls, encouraging the
donation of vital medicines, and cooperating in international drug procurement
efforts - all of which might be adopted without running afoul of the obligations
imposed by T.R.I.P.S.72 As discussed earlier, The Indian Patent Act, 1970 clearly
includes several provisions greatly supportive and facilitative of public access to
healthcare, and it remains vital that such provisions, along with alternate measures
such as the Drug Price Control Order, are used in a manner most supportive of
public access to healthcare.
As regards the supply of low-cost generic drugs to facilitate public access
to healthcare, the Indian pharmaceutical industry has traditionally been an
important supplier domestically, and to the less regulated markets of Africa, Asia
and Latin America, and the clarity regarding Article 6 of the Doha Declaration can
only add further value to such a trend. Due to the changed regime of international
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patent law during and after 2005, and the increasingly developed technological
capacity of the industry, some commentators believe that Indian pharmaceutical
firms could become major participants in the global marketplace, including the
regulated markets (i.e. U.S. and E.U.) and with increasingly sophisticated products.
In this regard, the characterisation of Indian pharmaceutical companies as copiers
lacking innovativeness is understood to be increasingly inaccurate, and several
Indian companies have been developing new drug delivery systems or alternative
formulations of existing molecules so as to improve dosing regimens.73 Therefore,
in some ways, the future prospects for the pharmaceutical industry look bright
provided that persistent strategic weaknesses are tackled appropriately and
immediately.
At the end of the day, it falls upon India and other developing countries to
make maximum legitimate use of the measures in-built into T.R.I.P.S. and
consequently into domestic legislation, apart from alternate measures including
drug price control, so as to ensure public access to health. While efficacious public
policy measures can be put into force to enable public access to health, it is
important to reiterate that India must ensure judicious use of such measures so
as to ensure that it meets its global requirements under T.R.I.P.S. while at the
same time it manages to ensure public access to health, without being dragged
into the formidable W.T.O. dispute settlement process or into the sights of
unilateral economic sanctions by developed countries. 74
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